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Available online 23 December 2016Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) still causes outbreaks despite public awareness and
implementation of health care measures, such as rapid viral diagnosis and patient quarantine. Here we describe
the current epidemiological picture ofMERS-CoV, focusing on humans and animals affected by this virus and pro-
pose speciﬁc intervention strategies that would be appropriate to controlMERS-CoV. One-third ofMERS-CoV pa-
tients develop severe lower respiratory tract infection and succumb to a fatal outcome; these patients would
require effective therapeutic antiviral therapy. Because of the lack of such intervention strategies, supportive
care is the best that can be offered at themoment. Limiting viral spread from symptomatic human cases to health
care workers and family members, on the other hand, could be achieved through prophylactic administration of
MERS-CoV neutralizing antibodies and vaccines. To ultimately prevent spread of the virus into the human popu-
lation, however, vaccination of dromedary camels – currently the only conﬁrmed animal host forMERS-CoV –may
be the best option to achieve a sustained drop in human MERS cases in time. In the end, a One Health approach
combining all these different efforts is needed to tackle this zoonotic outbreak.
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Coronaviruses (CoV) are known to cause mild upper respiratory
tract infections in humans. This paradigm was challenged when severe
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)-CoV emerged in 2002. SARS-CoV
causes mainly lower respiratory tract infections, such as bronchitis
and pneumonia. Approximately 10% of SARS-CoV patients developed
severe complications and succumbed to this disease. This virus originat-
ed from bats and was transmitted to humans through civet cats,
highlighting its zoonotic capacity. It spread worldwide and infected
~8000 individuals within a year, but was fortunately contained ine, Erasmus Medical Center, Dr
.
mans).
an open access article under the2003. There is currently no evidence of SARS-CoV circulating in the
human population [1]. However, a SARS-like CoV that is able to directly
infect human cells has been recently identiﬁed in horseshoe bats in
China [2]; therefore, continuous surveillance for these viruses remains
necessary.
A decade after the SARS-CoV epidemic, another novel CoV was iso-
lated from a 60-year-old Saudi Arabian man who presented with
acute pneumonia. He subsequently developed acute respiratory distress
syndrome and renal failure with a fatal outcome [3]. This virus, later
called the Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS)-CoV, attracted
public interest due to its resemblance to SARS-CoV. So far, at least
1800 individuals have been infectedwith an ~35% fatality rate. Different
from SARS, some individuals infected by MERS-CoV remain asymptom-
atic or develop only mild clinical manifestations [4,5]. Efforts to develop
effective preventive and therapeutic intervention strategies areCC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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surveillance studies and public healthmeasures that includepatient iso-
lation and quarantine [1]. Although these actions resulted in successful
containment of the SARS outbreak, MERS-CoV still remains a problem,
mainly in the Arabian Peninsula. The widespread circulation of MERS-
CoV in dromedary camels is most likely the driving force of these out-
breaks as novel zoonotic introductions of MERS-CoV may occur fre-
quently. Therefore, different intervention approaches may be
necessary to treat MERS patients, control zoonotic and nosocomial
transmission. Here we describe the affected groups in the ongoing
MERS-CoV outbreak and how distinct intervention strategies for each
of them may curb the spread of the virus.
2. The discovery of the virus and the subsequent rapid development
of diagnostics
When MERS patients are admitted to hospitals their clinical symp-
tomsmostly include fever, cough, expectoration and shortness of breath
[1,6]. Ground glass opacities and consolidation in the lungs are com-
monly reported in chest radiographs or computed tomography scans
[7]. However, these characteristics overlap with other lower respiratory
tract infections and are not pathognomonic for MERS-CoV, indicating
the need to develop laboratory-based diagnostic assayswith high sensi-
tivity and speciﬁcity.
Upon its discovery, MERS-CoV was found to replicate to high titers
and induce cytopathic effects in various different cell lines, thus en-
abling its rapid full genome characterization [3,8]. Two large replicase
open reading frames, ORF1a and ORF1b cover the 5′ region of the
MERS-CoV genome, whereas the 3′ end of the genome encodes struc-
tural proteins, i.e. spike (S), membrane (M), nucleocapsid (N), envelope
(E), and several accessory proteins (3, 4a, 4b, 5 and 8b). The nucleotide
sequence ofMERS-CoVwas used as a template to design primers for ge-
nome-based assays, i.e. real-time reverse-transcription polymerase
chain reaction (RT-PCR) and sequencing [9,10]. Primer pairs targeting
a region upstream of E (upE), N, ORF1a, ORF1b and RdRp genes were
then developed and shown to be highly sensitive and speciﬁc not only
for the EMC isolate but also for otherMERS-CoV isolates [9–11]. It is cur-
rently suggested to use upE RT-PCR as a screening assay and another
target gene as a conﬁrmatory assay [11].
Despite being highly speciﬁc and sensitive, RT-PCR-based assays still
have limitations as MERS-CoV can only be detected when it is actively
shed by the host. Serology-based assays were subsequently developed
to distinguish those individuals that had been exposed to MERS-CoV
in the past. Indirect immunoﬂuorescence assays (IFA) and neutraliza-
tion tests (plaque reduction neutralization test and microneutralization
test)were set up using susceptible cell lines andwhole virus particles [5,
12]. These assays require biosafety level 3 facilities to work with the in-
fectiousMERS-CoV in-vitro, limiting their usage. In addition,whole virus
IFA showed limited speciﬁcity toMERS-CoV due to cross-reactivity with
other human CoV [5,12]. Alternative assays using a pseudoparticle virus
and speciﬁc MERS-CoV antigens were then developed to solve this
issue. Two CoV structural proteins known to be highly antigenic are
the N and S proteins. Both proteins have been used to develop serolo-
gy-based assays in various platforms, i.e. recombinant IFA, western
blot, enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA), luciferase-based
antibody detection assay and protein microarray [5,13–16]. The N pro-
tein is relatively conserved among CoVs, whereas the S1 domain, locat-
ed in S, is more divergent among CoVs, making it an ideal candidate for
CoV speciﬁc diagnostic serological assays. However, it is important to
note that none of the serological assays available to date has been
fully validated for speciﬁcity and sensitivity, therefore due care must
be taken in interpreting the results of large serosurveillance studies.
Possible cross reactivity and/or low sensitivity of these assays can lead
to failure in determining the prevalence of true MERS-CoV positive
cases in a given population. In turn, this has an impact on the calculated
fatality rate of the viral infection. Further studies using a set ofwell-characterized sera are required for the determination of cut-off
values and assessing cross-reactivity between MERS-CoV and other
humanCoVs. It is crucial to properly determine theMERS-CoVprevalence
at a population level to develop adequate control programs.
3. Treatment options for MERS patients
One third of the symptomatic patients develop severe pneumonia
that ultimately leads to a fatal outcome. In general, these individuals
are characterized by advanced age (N55 years old) and may have mul-
tiple underlying comorbidities, i.e. diabetes mellitus, asthma, chronic
kidney failure, heart disease and immunosuppression [6,17]. Most im-
portantly, they are also prone to develop life-threatening complications,
such as sepsis, acute respiratory distress syndrome, and acute kidney
failure [1,6]. Therefore, rapid and effective treatment options are re-
quired in order to limit the number of cases with a fatal outcome.
Several studies are dedicated to the development of effective treat-
ments against MERS-CoV, either based on the use of broad-spectrum
or MERS-CoV speciﬁc therapeutic agents. In-vitro, MERS-CoV is highly
sensitive to type I interferon (IFN). While MERS-CoV replication in
Vero cells could be efﬁciently reduced with low levels of recombinant
IFNα, in the case of SARS-CoV much higher concentrations are needed
to achieve a similar inhibition of viral replication [18]. Other broad spec-
trum antivirals, such as ribavirin, mycophenolic acid and cyclosporine-
A, also have antiviral activity against MERS-CoV in-vitro. Combinations
of ribavirin and IFNα may have a synergistic effect as shown by in-
vitro and in vivo studies in rhesus macaques [19,20]. However, treat-
ment should be initiated quite early after the infection; hence it has a
limited effective therapeutic window of opportunity. Experimental
SARS-CoV infection in mice showed that administration of type I IFN
6 h post inoculation (pi) is life-saving, while 24 h pi it is detrimental,
supporting the limited effective therapeutic window of opportunity
[21]. The importance of having sufﬁcient type I IFN being produced
early after the SARS-CoV infection has also been investigated in experi-
mentally infected macaques. Advanced-age macaques do not mount
sufﬁcient type I IFN responses upon SARS-CoV inoculation but instead
upregulate expression of interleukin-8 (IL-8), a neutrophil
chemoattractant, leading to the development of acute lung injury
(ALI). Most importantly, treatmentwith type I IFN at day 1 and 3 pi pre-
vents this IL-8 mediated ALI [22]. The limited effective therapeutic win-
dow of opportunity of type I IFN might explain why a cocktail regimen
of ribavirin and IFNα did not improve the overall survival rates seen
in human MERS cases, despite these promising in-vitro and in-vivo re-
sults [18–20,23,24]. Other candidate drugs were identiﬁed by screening
for MERS-CoV inhibitory activity using FDA-approved drugs that are
used to treat other diseases. Two research groups reported that both
chloroquine and chlorpromazine have potential therapeutic antiviral
activity. Chlorpromazine affects the assembly of clathrin-coated pits at
the plasma membrane, while chloroquine plays a role in endosomal
acidiﬁcation. By interrupting these biological processes, those drugs
likely inhibit MERS-CoV endocytosis at the host cell membrane and fu-
sion in endosomes intracellularly [25,26].
Due to its limited effective therapeutic window of opportunity,
broad spectrum antiviral agents might not be sufﬁcient to treat severe
MERS-CoV patients. Several promising CoV speciﬁc therapeutic agents
have recently been reviewed extensively [27]. These include efforts to
develop effective intervention measures aiming to disrupt the interac-
tion of MERS-CoV with its host receptor, dipeptidyl peptidase 4
(DPP4). Although, the crystal structure of DPP4 and the S1 protein of
MERS-CoV allowed visualization of the interacting amino acids in both
proteins, no antagonists other than adenosine deaminase (ADA) and
antibodies that recognize the receptor binding domain (RBD) have
been identiﬁed so far [28–30]. Importantly, inhibitors of the enzymatic
activity of the DPP4, generally used to treat type 2 diabetes patients,
did not block infection of target cells with MERS-CoV [31]. Another po-
tential target for treatment is the S2 protein of MERS-CoV, a subdomain
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tion between heptad region (HR) 1 and 2 within S2 protein is impera-
tive for MERS-CoV entry into its target cell. This interaction can be
disrupted using an artiﬁcial HR2 homologous peptide, making it a
promising entry inhibitor for MERS-CoV [32,33]. There are also novel
drugs aimed at inhibiting virus replication within host cells, targeting
the non-structural proteins (nsp) of coronaviruses. Examples are K22,
a novel inhibitor of nsp6 [34] and SSYA10-001 that acts on nsp13 [35].
The pocket binding ligand of these compounds is conserved among
coronaviruses making them promising pan-coronavirus replication
inhibitors.
4. Preventing human-to-human transmission of MERS-CoV
MERS patients require proper quarantine measures to hinder the
spread of the MERS-CoV to other susceptible individuals. Although sev-
eral studies performed in Saudi Arabia and South Korea indicated that
human-to-human transmission is relatively limited, it has been found
to be crucially important, especially in the hospital outbreaks [5,36,
37]. Inefﬁcient human-to-human transmission is partly due to the tro-
pism of MERS-CoV. Autopsy results from one fatal human MERS case
and ex-vivo experiments using human lung explants showed that this
virus infects the lower respiratory tract epithelium [38,39]. These obser-
vations are consistent with the fact that in most cases MERS-CoV isola-
tion from human samples was successful only when lower respiratory
tract samples were used [3,40]. Although it is possible to detect MERS-
CoV in the upper respiratory tract, viral RNA levels are generally very
low compared to the lower respiratory tract [40–42]. This restricted tro-
pism ofMERS-CoV in the lower respiratory tract is supported by the dis-
tribution of its host receptor. DPP4 is expressed in the lower but not in
the upper human respiratory tract epithelium [43].
As a result of the lower respiratory tract tropism, close contact be-
tween individuals is necessary to transmitMERS-CoV between humans.
Healthcare workers and family members are therefore at particular risk
to acquire secondary MERS-infections [5,36], as reﬂected by the MERS
outbreaks which mostly occur in the healthcare centers [44,45]. Other
groups that are at risk for MERS-CoV infection are slaughterhouse
workers and camel shepherds. In cohort studies in Saudi Arabia and
Qatar, these groups with camel contact were reported to have a higher
percentage ofMERS-CoV seropositivity as compared to the general pop-
ulation [15,46]. The fact that camel-farm-related outbreaks are general-
ly less common compared to health-care-related outbreaks may also be
helpful in containing the outbreak [47,48].
During the SARS-CoV outbreak in Hong Kong, active surveillance
followed by proper quarantinemeasures was shown to be highly effec-
tive in limiting the spread of the virus to other susceptible individuals
[4]. One important factor that helped to contain the outbreak relates
to the fact that the virus rarely causes subclinical infection and virus ex-
cretion peaked approximately 10 days after the onset of symptoms,
allowing successful containment when SARS patients are diagnosed
early after disease onset [4,49,50]. Recent data from the MERS-CoV out-
break in South Korea also showed that viral shedding in severe cases
peaked in the second week after the onset of disease [51]. Therefore,
similar to SARS, rapid identiﬁcation of MERS-CoV patients, followed by
proper quarantine measures, should be sufﬁcient to signiﬁcantly limit
the spread of the virus, especially in hospital settings where most
MERS outbreaks occur. Indeed, this strategy has been reported to be
useful in controlling the MERS-CoV outbreak in South Korea [37].
Most likely, such approaches had not been properly applied in the ear-
lier outbreaks in Saudi Arabia. The fact that more recent MERS cases re-
ported in 2016 from this regionmostly seem to be restricted to primary
cases with a history of camel contact but less to nosocomial outbreaks
may indicate that more effective control measures have been imple-
mented to contain the spread of the virus.
Studies in Hong Kong during the SARS-CoV outbreak also indicated
that infection with SARS-CoVwas unlikely to result in an asymptomaticinfection [49,50], explaining why active surveillance and quarantine
were so effective in stopping the outbreak [4]. In case of MERS, asymp-
tomatic MERS-CoV-infected individuals that spread the virus may fuel
the ongoing outbreak as these are currently not identiﬁed by diagnostic
screening. It is difﬁcult to precisely assess the percentage of asymptom-
atic MERS-CoV infections in the human population, partly due to the
lack of active serological surveillance and fully validated commercial se-
rological assays. However, asymptomatic individuals who had contact
with MERS patients have been identiﬁed using a combination of RT-
PCR, ELISA, IFA and PRNT assays; suggesting that in case of MERS,
the virus can indeed cause mild to asymptomatic infections [5,36,52].
In addition, subclinical MERS-CoV infection with long term excretion
of MERS-CoV RNA has been reported [52]. Unlike severe MERS cases
these patients are mostly young tomiddle-agedwithout underlying co-
morbidities. This group is primarily dominated by health care workers
in the hospitals where MERS-CoV patients were admitted and secondly
by family members having close contact with the severe MERS-CoV pa-
tients [5,36]. In one contact tracing study, out of 280 individuals who
had contact with MERS-CoV patients, 12 were concluded to have prob-
able MERS-CoV infections. Only one out of these 12 contacts developed
symptoms which later progressed to respiratory failure and fatal out-
come, while the rest reported no symptoms [5]. Therefore, during an
ongoing outbreak in a health care setting, it is imperative to protect
the healthcare workers that are at high risk of acquiring the infection
[36,45]. In this scenario, prophylactic regimens, for example using hu-
manized monoclonal antibodies, would be theoretically suitable to
limit the spread of the virus.Monoclonal antibodiesmostly have limited
therapeutic efﬁcacy despite promising in-vivo results, yet they might
still serve as a potent prophylactic measure, as exempliﬁed by
palivizumab, a monoclonal antibody against respiratory syncytial
virus. This antibody is effective in reducing the frequency of hospitaliza-
tions in children at high risk of infection, but its efﬁcacy for treatment
purposes has not been demonstrated [53]. The receptor binding domain
(RBD) located within the S1 protein could serve as a target for human-
ized monoclonal antibodies. These antibodies have been generated
using different approaches, i.e. from non-immune human peripheral
bloodmononuclear cells [54,55], from yeast cells expressing human an-
tibodies [56], frommemory B cells obtained from infected humans [57],
or frommice immunizedwith theRBDdomain of the S protein ofMERS-
CoV [58]. Several of these antibodies have been reported to be effective
in-vitro and in-vivo [55–59]. One monoclonal antibody against MERS-
CoV, m336, has been shown to be effective as a prophylactic agent in
rabbits [60]. Inhibiting virus attachment could also be achieved by
targeting the host receptor, DPP4. Unfortunately, commercially avail-
able DPP4 inhibitors that are marketed as type II diabetes mellitus
drugs were not able to serve this purpose, since they do not bind to
the RBD [56]. Monoclonal antibodies targeting DPP4, on the other
hand, also may inhibit MERS-CoV attachment in vitro. One of these
antibodies, YS110, has been used in a phase I clinical trial for patients
with DPP4-expressing cancers [61].
There are also examples of antiviral agents that can be used for pro-
phylactic purposes. Post-exposure prophylaxis using oseltamivir was
shown to be effective in reducing inﬂuenza transmission during the
2009 H1N1 inﬂuenza outbreak in Singapore military camps [62]. Intra-
nasal pretreatment of agedmicewith poly (I.C.), a TLR3 agonist, induces
IFN expression and provides protection against lethal dose of SARS-CoV
and inﬂuenza A virus [63].
Besides these prophylactic measures, vaccines could also be applied
in particular risk groups. Many different approaches have been taken to
develop MERS vaccines (reviewed in [27]). An orthopoxvirus-based
vaccine using modiﬁed vaccinia Ankara (MVA) expressing the spike
protein has been developed and shown to induce neutralizing antibod-
ies and speciﬁc cytotoxic T cell response against MERS-CoV [64]. The
MVA itself has been validated as an effective vaccine platform in
humans [65]. Unlike prophylactic regimens, protection induced by
vaccine intervention is long lasting, although not immediate. Thus
14 W. Widagdo et al. / One Health 3 (2017) 11–16vaccination would be more appropriate for camel shepherds and
slaughterhouse workers who are at a continuous risk of being infected
by MERS-CoV from the animals.
5. Intervention of theMERS-CoV outbreak at the source: vaccination
of dromedary camels
The zoonotic capacity ofMERS-CoVwas suggested already at the be-
ginning of its emergence, since it was observed that the virus is closely
related to bat CoVs but not to other human CoVs [3,8]. Bats have been
suggested to be one of the natural hosts of MERS-CoV but the evidence
supporting transmission of this virus from bats to other species is cur-
rently lacking. Serology-based assays applied using sera from various
animal species in search of the animal hosts for MERS-CoV, revealed
the dromedary camel as the most likely zoonotic source for MERS-CoV
[13,66,67]. The high percentage of seropositivity against MERS-CoV
among camels in the Arabian Peninsula and Africa, as early as the
1980s, indicates that MERS-CoV did circulate in this animal long before
being introduced to the human population [13,14,66–72]. Screening of
dromedary camel nasal swabs subsequently led to identiﬁcation and
isolation of MERS-CoV from dromedaries, conﬁrming its circulation in
this animal species [14,47,73,74]. Camels developmild upper respirato-
ry tract infections upon experimental inoculation of MERS-CoV, consis-
tent with localization of DPP4 at this location [43,75,76]. Furthermore,
two studies of humanMERS cases post-contact with infected camels re-
ported high similarity in virus sequences obtained from both the camels
and humans [47,77]. These studies alongwith a case control study iden-
tifying direct exposure to camels as a risk factor forMERS-CoV infection,
and serology studies showing higher seropositivity among camel con-
tacts compared to non-camel contacts, support camel-to-human trans-
mission of MERS-CoV [15,17,46]. The risk of humans acquiring MERS-
CoV infection from camels could be high due to the wide geographical
distribution of MERS-CoV seropositive camels, also demonstrated by
the fact that MERS-CoV seropositive livestock handlers were identiﬁed
in Kenya [78], but it might be underestimated due to unrecorded sub-
clinical infections in humans.
Efforts to screen other animal species for MERS-CoV are currently on-
going. Phylogenetic analysis using RBD within DPP4 of different species
identiﬁed several livestock animals, i.e. sheep, goats, cattle, llamas and
horses to cluster togetherwith other susceptible animals, including drom-
edary camels. Transfection of non-susceptible cells with DPP4 of these
different animal species converted these cells to become susceptible toFig. 1.Animals and humans potentially involved in theMERS outbreak and the intervention stra
natural hosts ofMERS-CoV, however the evidence supporting transmission of this virus frombat
both camels and humans. A combined One Health approach may be needed in order to stop oMERS-CoV [79,80]. However, serological studies did not provide evidence
for MERS-CoV circulating in these animals [13,66,81]. Experimental
MERS-CoV infections showed that alpacas shed infectious virus up to
twelve days post inoculation [82], and they could transmit infectious
virus to other naïve alpacas [83]. These observations are consistent with
ﬁndings from a study at a farm located in the Al Shahaniya region of
Qatarwhich showed that 15out of 20 alpacaswere foundpositive for neu-
tralizing antibodies againstMERS-CoV. These alpacaswere housed nearby
to camels, also seropositive for MERS-CoV, and taken care of by the same
shepherds [84]. Although pigs and llamas were found susceptible to
MERS-CoVupon experimental infection [85], thus far no evidencewas ob-
tained from the ﬁeld for seroconversion in these animal species. Limited
shedding of infectious viruswas reported in goat, sheep, and horse exper-
imentally inoculated with MERS-CoV, suggesting that these animals play
minimal to no role in spreading MERS-CoV in current outbreaks [86].
These studies suggest that among the livestock animals, dromedary
camels are the main species responsible for spreading the virus.
Given the fact that livestock animals, especially dromedary camels,
can potentially transmit MERS-CoV to humans, preventive measures
need to be applied to reduce the risk of zoonotic transmission. During
the SARS outbreak, civet cats, which posed a risk of transmitting the
virus to humans, were culled [87], thus potentially contributing in lim-
iting the outbreak. In case of MERS, vaccine based strategies have to be
applied to reduce the transmission of the virus to humans. The MVA-
based vaccine against MERS-CoVmight be a suitable intervention strat-
egy for this purpose. This vaccine has been shown to induce neutralizing
antibodies and signiﬁcantly reduce MERS-CoV shedding in camels [76].
This vaccination strategymay especially be applied to young dromedary
calves at 5–6 months post-parturition, when they lose their maternal
antibodies [88]. Further studies should also address whether this vac-
cine is able to provide protection on the long term. The fact that this vac-
cinemay provide additional protection against camelpox virus, another
pox virus that could cause severe disease in camels, should be taken into
account when evaluating the cost-effectiveness of this vaccine [76].
6. One Health approach for intervention
Despite current implementation of rapid diagnostic and public
health measures, new MERS-CoV cases are still continuously being
reported. This suggests that multiple interventions targeting different
affected groups would be necessary to stop these outbreaks, as summa-
rized in Fig. 1. As described in this review, different interventiontegies thatwould apply to these different groups. Bats have been suggested to be one of the
s to other species is currently lacking. On the other hand,MERS-CoVhas been isolated from
ngoing outbreaks of MERS-CoV.
15W. Widagdo et al. / One Health 3 (2017) 11–16approachesmay be needed to limit theMERS-CoV outbreaks by treating
MERS-CoV patients and by controlling both zoonotic and nosocomial
transmission. Prophylactic drugswould be appropriate to use when im-
mediate protection is required to limit the spread of the virus, for exam-
ple to protect health care workers and family members of MERS-CoV
patients. Camel contacts that have higher chances of infection, on the
other hand, may beneﬁt from the long term protection induced by vac-
cines. Such vaccination could also be applied to the animal host of
MERS-CoV which has close contact with humans, mainly dromedary
camels, to limit zoonotic transmission. Effective treatment strategies
for severe human MERS-CoV patients are the most problematic to im-
plement. These MERS-CoV patients may require a cocktail treatment
regimen consisting of potent antivirals, immunomodulatory agents
and other supportive treatments to control disease progression and im-
prove the prognosis of this severe lung infection. Although Type I IFN re-
mains a promising treatment, its beneﬁcial effect in severe and fatal
MERS-CoV patients might be limited due to the timing of the drug ad-
ministration as it has a narrow effective therapeutic window of oppor-
tunity [21]. Further efforts to better understand MERS-CoV
pathogenesis are needed to identify viral and host factors that play a sig-
niﬁcant role in the progression of MERS in humans and offer potential
novel treatment and intervention options.Acknowledgements
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